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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
16548 
THOMAS WYHAN BERG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with distribution of a 
controlled substance, marijuana, wherein nothing of value 
is exchanged in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)A(c) 
(1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before the court, having 
waived a jury trial, and found guilty of one count of 
distribution of a controlled substance on May 25, 1979, 
in the Fourth Judicial District, in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable George E. Balli£, presiding. 
On June 29, 1979, appellant was sentenced to a prison term 
not in excess of five years at the Utah State Prison and 
a :!:ine of $1,500. The prison term was suspended and 
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appellant was placed on probation after serving a six 
month sentence in the Utah County Jail as a condition 
of probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict 
and judgments of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 20, 1978, Craig Wiseman contacted 
Jill Hales about the possibility of Ms. Hales obtaining 
"a pound" of marijuana for him (Tr.S4,12-13). Ms. 
Hales agreed to procure the marijuana for Wiseman (Tr. 
12-13). The next day, November 21, 1978, appellant 
telephoned Ms. Hales and inquired whether she and Teri 
Barney, Ms. Hale's friend, "wanted to drop down for a 
cup of coffee" (Tr .14, 24). Ms. Hales then told appellant 
that a friend of hers had asked her to get "some stuff" 
and she"asked him [appellant] if he could maybe find 
[her] something." (Tr.l4). Appellant answered that "he 
would try" and Hs. Hales said she "would see him at 
coffee" (Tr.l4). 
Later that day (November 21, 1978), at about 
10:00 a.m., Ms. Hales and Ms. Barney drove to see appell~ 
(Tr .15). When they arrived, Hs. Hales and appellant went 
-2-
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to the living room, out of the presence of Ms. Barney 
(Tr.lS). At that time, appellant presented Ms. Hales 
with the marijuana and said, "I have got this for 
you" (Tr.l6). Ms. Hales thanked appellant for the 
marijuana and "told him • [she] would bring the 
money to him later;" appellant responded "Okay" (Tr.l7). 
Ms. Hales and Ms. Barney then drove to the 
Golden Spike Restaurant to deliver the marijuana to 
Mr. Wiseman which "was what [she] had planned • • the 
night before • . • [with] Craig Wiseman" (Tr .18) • 
(Emphasis added.) At the restaurant, Ms. Barney (who 
was driving) parked the car in the parking lot (Tr.l9). 
Ms. Hales removed the marijuana from her purse (Tr.l9, 
46). At this point, Ms. Barney saw the marijuana for the 
first time (Tr.l9,27-28). The marijuana was wrapped in 
a white windbreaker and placed in Wiseman's car (Tr.29, 
48) by Ms. Hales. The two women drove "to the front of 
the Spike" and Hs. Hales went inside to find Wiseman 
(Tr.48). Ms. Hales spoke with Wiseman "for a minute" 
and returned alone to the car (Tr .19). ~viseman soon 
came out to the car and handed Hs. Hales "a wad" of 
money (Tr.l9), determined to be $450 (Tr.55). 
As the two women began to drive from the 
restaurant, a police car pulled up behind them (Tr.l9). 
Ms. Hales hid the money under the floor mat of the car 
-3-
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(Tr.l9-20). The police officers arrested Ms. Hales 
(Tr.20) and Wiseman as he was driving from the scene 
(Tr •. 56). Teri Barney was not arrested (Tr. 29). 
Ms. Hales was read her rights and taken to 
police headquarters and questioned (Tr.21-22). During 
the conversation, the police learned that Ms. Hales 
was in the process of getting a divorce and she "was 
having problems [with a] . custody matter" 
regarding her child (Tr.38). The police, therefore, 
offered to forego charging her with involvement in the 
drug transaction (since the prosecution would be detri-
mental in her child custody matter, in exchange for her 
acting as an informant against appellant (Tr.21-23). Ms. 
Hales was wired with a listening device and returned to 
appellant's home (Tr.22). Ms. Hales was vague about the 
conversation she had with appellant upon returning, but 
she testified that appellant asked her if she was in 
trouble; she asked him if he had "any more stuff," to whic' 
appellant replied "maybe a little;" and appellant asked 
whether or not "they got it" (no explanation was given 
as to whom "they" referred or what "it" was) .(Tr.22-23). 
(Judge Ballif's memorandum decision notes that this 
phrase meant "whether or not the cops got the 'stuff.'" 
(R. 22)). 
-4-
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On the basis of Ms. Hales' information about 
her receipt of marijuana from appellant on the morning 
of November 21, 1978, a complaint and a search warrant 
was sworn out before Judge J. Gordon Knudsen on November 
21, 1978. An information later charged appellant with 
distributing a controlled substance to Ms. Hales wherein 
nothing o"f value was exchanged (R.2,3-4,ll). 
The crime of which appellant was convicted was 
distribution of a controlled substance to Ms. Hales 
wherein nothing of value was exchanged. This distri-
bution occurred when appellant gave Ms. Hales the pound 
of marijuana on the morning of November 21, 1978. (R.2,ll). 
Although another drug transaction occurred between 
Ms. Hales and Mr. Wiseman at the Golden Spike Restaurant 
that offense is not at issue in this case. 
On May 24, 1979, appellant waived his right to 
a jury trial (Tr.3-5) and had his case tried before the 
Honorable George E. Ballif. The trial concluded on the 
same day and Judge Ballif's decision was delivered on 
May 25, 1979 (R.21-23). After outlining the facts, Judge 
Ballif ruled that: 
On the basis of the aforesaid 
facts . . . Jill Hales was not an 
accomplice in that her receipt of 
[the marijuana] :rom the defendant 
-5-
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constituted the offense of possession 
of a Schedule I controlled substance, 
and not the transfer for value or 
otherwise of the same which the de-
fendant is on trial for in this pro-
ceeding. 
(R.22, emphasis added.) 
Judge Balli£ concluded that Ms. Hales' testimony 
did "not have to be corroborated by any other evidence" 
in order to convict appellant of the crime charged. (R. 22). 
The Court cited the cases of State v. Kasia, 27 
Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972) and State v. Cornish, 
560 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1977) as the controlling cases. 
In his decision, Judge Balli£ called "counsel's 
attention to House Bill 143" which amends § 77-31-18 
(1953, as amended) and provides that a conviction may be 
obtained on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
Appellant now appeals that conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COR-
RECTLY RULED THAT THE STATE'S 
KEY WITNESS, JILL HALES, \'lAS 
NOT APPELLANT'S ACCOMPLICE. 
The major thrust of appellant's appeal (and, 
indeed, the entire basis of the Amicus Curiae brief filed 
in conjunction with this case) is that Judge Ballif im-
-6-
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properly applied the new accomplice statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-31-18 (1979), to the present matter. Yet, this basic 
premise ignores the fundamental finding of Judge Ballif . 
that Jill Hales was not appellant's accomplice and her 
testimony alone, could therefore convict appellant. 
Because of this conclusion, the new accomplice statute 
was not relied on in admitting the testimony of Jill Hales. 
Ms. Hales' testimony is a complete and inculpatory in-
dictment against appellant and was sufficient to convict 
appellant of the crime charged. Since Judge Ballif ruled 
Hs. Hales was not an accomplice the possible retroactive 
application of the new accomplice statute is not at issue. 
Respondent submitts that Judge Ballif's decision (R.21-23) 
that Ms. Hales was not an accomplice is a logical, accurate 
ruling. In dicta, Judge Ballif called attention to the 
fact that a new trend in the area of criminal accomplice 
law is developing as evidenced by the Utah Legislature's 
enactment of the new accomplice statute. Clearly, if 
Judge Ballif had relied on the new accomplice statute 
in his decision it would have been inconsistant and unnecessary 
to rule that Ms. Hales was not appellant's accomplice. 
Respondent submits that the decision that Ms. Hales was 
-7-
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not appellant's accomplice was sound and justified. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1953), as amended, outlines the 
requirements one must meet to be an accomplice to a 
crime: 
Every person acting with the 
mental state required for the com-
mission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person 
to engage in conduct which consti-
tutes an offense shall be criminally 
liable as a party for such conduct. 
Here, while Ms. Hales did encourage appellant to 
procure the marijuana for her, she did not "engage in 
conduct which constitut[ed]" the same offense for which 
appellant is charged in the instant matter (distribution 
of a controlled substance not for value) . "Conduct which 
constitutes" the same offense is necessary in order for 
a participant in a crime to be deemed an accomplice. In 
State v. Davie, 121 Utah 184, 240 P.2d 263 (1952) this 
requirement was clearly established: 
We have construed the term 
[accomplice] to mean one who could 
be charged as a principal with the 
defendant on trial. State v. Fertig, 
Utah, 233 P.2d 347; State v. Bowman, 
92 Utah 540, 79 P.2d 458, 111 A.L.R. 
1393. This definition is generally 
recognized to be correct, see 22 
C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 786, p. 1335; 
14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 110. 
240 P.2d at 263-264. 
-8-
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To illustrate this point, respondent offers the 
following example: The principal in a "fencing" oper-
ation who seeks and buys stolen goods from thieves and 
burglars could not be said to be an accomplice with the~ 
in the numerous, isolated thefts or burglaries which the 
"suppliers" have committed. The operator's crime is the 
narrow offense of receiving, possessing and re-selling 
stolen pro"perty. The "suppliers'" crimes are those of 
theft, burglary or robbery. However, if the fencing 
operator actively participated with the thieves and burglars 
in the commission of the thefts, burglaries or robberies, 
then he would obviously be an accomplice. 
Recently, this court has expanded the Davie 
definition of accomplice to include those actors who 
" ... knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent 
with the principal offender, [unite] in the commission 
of a crime, so that he could also be charged with the 
same offense." State v. Georgopoulos, 27 Utah 2d 53, 
492 P.2d 1353, 1354 (1972). In accord, State v. Helm, 
563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 1977). 
Thus, in applying this additional requirement 
of "common intent" to the hypothetical above, comparison 
wi~h the present case is apparent. The fencing operator 
could not be an accomplice with the thieves and burglars 
-9-
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because he did not have the requisite intent to commit 
theft, burglary or robbery--even though it could be said 
that he encouraged and even solicted crime. Likewise in 
the present case, Ms. Hales cannot be said to be an 
accomplice with appellant because she did not have the 
requisite intent to distribute marijuana not for value 
at the moment the drug was given to her from appellant. 
She only had intent to receive the marijuana. 
Probably because of this very rationale this 
Court, in State v. Kasai, supra, ruled that "[t)he 
purchaser of narcotics is not an accomplice of the seller." I 
495 P. 2d at 1266. (See further discussion of Kasai, infra.) I 
Section § 76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended, (above quoted) has been relied upon in support 
of the proposition that such intent, as required by 
is necessary in order for a participant to be found to 
be an accomplice. In State v. Cornish, supra, the Court, 
after quoting § 76-2~202, stated: 
Under that statute and under the 
generally accepted meaning of the term, 
an "accomplice" is one who participates 
in a crime in such a way that he could 
be charged and tried for the same offense. 
From that definition, it will be seen that 
it does not include a person who, without 
using inducement or persuasion which 
would amount to entrapment, merely provides 
an opportunity for one who is disposed to 
conunit a crime. More specifically 
-10-
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applicable here, a person so acting 
under the direction of a peace officer 
in attempting to discover violations 
of law, is not an accomplice. 
560 P.2d at 1136. In accord, State v. Kasai, supra. 
Thus, in the instant case, since appellant's 
offense was distribution of a controlled substance to 
Ms. Hales,_ she could not have also been charged with 
distribution of a controlled substance wherein nothing 
of value is exchanged. She therefore cannot be found to 
be appellant's accomplice. Ms. Hales did not partici-
pate as a distributor of the controlled substance in the 
narrow transaction at issue here. Rather, she was the 
recipient of the controlled substance. Although this 
Court has retreated somewhat from this test of whether 
a participant could have been charged with the same offense 
as a basis of determining whether an accomplice status 
exists (see State v. Foust, 588 P.2d 170 (Utah 1978)) 1 , 
1 Resoondent notes further that the Foust case is an 
ext'i:-eme case. The Court \vas there faced with deter-
mining whether appellant's 16 year old stepdaughter 
could be said to be his acconplice in the crime of 
incest. The Court ruled she was or could be an 
accomplice. Respondent suggests this case is an 
anamoly and is not in accord with the thrust of 
the other Utah cases on the subject of accomplice 
la~, as cited herein. 
-11-
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it remains a useful starting point for an inquiry into 
a participant's connection with the crime. 
In making such an inquiry, an important ruling 
by this Court in State v. Kasai, supra, is relevant. 
Kasai holds: 
The purchaser of narcotics is 
not an accomplice of the seller, as 
the offense of the purchaser is 
"possession" and not "selling"; and, 
therefore, the conviction of a defend-
ant may be founded on the purchaser's 
uncorroborated testimony. 
495 P.2d at 1266. 
The analogy is easily made between the "purchaser" 
in Kasai and Ms. Hales -- a non-purchasing recipient -- in 
the instant case. And since Ms. Hales received the mari-
juana from appellant, she too can only be deemed to have 
been in possession of the drug. Thus, as Kasai holds, 
she cannot be found to be appellant's accomplice in the 
offense for which appellant was charged. In a similar 
rultng, the Court in State v. Washington, 25 Utah 2d 111, 
476 P.2d 1019 (1970) rejected an appellant's claim that 
certain witnesses to a crime for which he was convicted 
were actually his accomplices. 
In Washington, the defendant was convicted of I 
0' I receiving stolen property. Three other holders and possess-~ 
-12-
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of the stolen property testified at trial about the 
defendant's connection with the stolen goods. To defendant's 
contention that these three witnesses were his accomplices, 
the Court responded: 
While these witnesses may have 
been ~uilty of similar offenses, the 
record fails to reveal that they in 
any way participated with the de-
·fendant in the crime here charged 
against him. 
476 P.2d at 1021. 
The same rationale is applicable in the present 
case. Merely because Ms. Hales "may have been guilty of 
similar offenses "of which appellant was herein convicted 
(i.e., possession or distribution to Mr. Wiseman), such a 
fact, can not, without more, automatically result in her 
being deemed appellant's accomplice. Rather, Washington 
requires that appellant must do more than assert that 
Ms. Hales may have committed similar crimes in order for 
her participation in the crime charged to appellant to 
reach an accomplice level; i.e., he must show that she 
''participated with the defendant in the crime charged." 
Id., emphasis added. 
Scrutiny of the facts shows that Ms. Hales' 
participation did not reach such a level. Appellant's 
-13-
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attorney, on cross examination of ~is. Hales, elicited 
the following: 
Q. And Craig Wiseman took the ini-
tiative to call you on the 20th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Befg [sic) was not aware 
of that phone call in the sense 
that he was not present and was 
not aware of when it was made? 
A. No. 
Q. And he did not authorize you to 
talk with Mr. Wiseman in any way? 
A. No. 
Q. This was your deal and Mr. Wiseman's 
deal, in a sense, and it ·was a con-
versation between the two of you? 
A. Right. 
Tr. 25-26 (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, Ms. Hales' planning, solicitation, encouragement 
and intent to commit a crime was not with appellant, but 
was with Mr. Wiseman. Thus, Ms. Hales' major participation 
in this entire series of drug transactions, is with Mr. 
l~iseman, and not with appellant. As to the specific crime 
at issue here, Ms. Hales acted only as a receiving agent or 
condiut for Mr. Wiseman, without appellant's knowledge oft~ 
prearranged plan. Thus, under the Davie, Kasai and 1\lashingtc:, 
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tests, she cannot be an accomplice of appellant even though 
she may have engaged in similar drug-related conduct. Her 
intent was not to distribute marijuana not for value. Tpis 
conclusion is further supported by two Utah Supreme Court 
cases: State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972) 
and State v. Helm, supra. 
In Gee, the appellant argued that two witnesses 
to his acts of child abuse (which led to the child's death) 
were in fact his accomplices. This Court disagreed and 
ruled: 
Defendant's assertion is without 
merit. The baby died of head injuries; 
there is not a scintilla of evidence to 
indicate the witnesses advised, instigated, 
encouraged or assisted defendant in the 
perpetration of this crime. Futhermore, 
mere presence combined with knowledge 
that a crime is about to be committed, 
where the person contributes nothing to 
the doing of the act, will not itself 
constitute one an accomplice. 
498 P.2d at 665 (Emphasis added.) 
In Helm, the appellant made a similar argument. 
He claimed that two witnesses, junior officers in 
the Highway Patrol, who were present at the scene of a 
crime he was convicted of were actually his accomplices. 
-15-
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In rejecting the claim, this Court held: 
To establish that predicate, it 
would have to appear that the offi-
cers knowingly, voluntarily and in-
tentionally united with the defend-
ant and aided, abetted, or encour-
aged in the commission of the crime. 
Moreover, the mere presence where a 
crime is being committed, or about 
to be committed, without such an 
intent to join therein, being shown, 
is not sufficient to find that one 
is an accomplice. 
563 P.2d at 797. 
Ms. Hales' actions in the instant case similarly, 
do not support a claim that she was appellant's accomplice. 
Merely because whe was present at the scene of the crime 
and had knowledge that a criminal act was about to be 
committed is not sufficient to find that she was an 
accomplice. Furthermore, as Helm establishes, where it 
appears that Ms. Hales did not unite with appellant in 
the commission of the specific crime appellant is charged 
with, then the accomplice claim of appellant must be re-
jected. 
Respondent submits that a careful review of the 
facts in this matter coupled with an application of the 
relevant case law show that Judge Balli£ correctly ruled 
that Ms. Hales was not and can not be deemed appellant's 
accomplice in the narrow crime under review. 
-16-
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POINT II 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, 
THAT JILL HALES WAS APPEL-
LANT'S ACCOMPLICE, SUFFI-
CIENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE, 
WHICH CONNECTED APPELLANT 
WITH THE COMMISSION OF THE 
CRIME, WAS PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL TO SATISFY THE ACCOM-
PLICE STATUTE'S REQUIREMENT 
OF CORROBORATION. 
Respondent again asserts the fact that Judge 
Ballif determined that Ms. Hales was not an accomplice in 
the crime at issue here and that consequently corroboration 
is not relevant. But inasmuch as appellant has claimed 
that insufficient corroboration evidence was presented at 
trial and should this Court rule that Ms. Hales was an 
accomplice,this Point is necessary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953) as amended, 
(pre - May 8, 1979) provided: 
A conviction shall not be had 
on the testimony of an accomplice, 
unless he is corroborated by other 
evidence, which in itself and with-
out the aid of the testimony of the 
accomnlice tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the 
offense; and the corroboration shall 
not be sufficient, if it merely 
shows the commission of the offense 
or the circumstances thereof. 
Thus, if Ms. Hales were an accomplice, corroboration 
-17-
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of her testimony must be presented before a conviction 
of appellant can be sustained. At trial, two witnesses 
in addition to Ms. Hales testified concerning the events 
of November 20 and 21, 1978: Teri Barney and Craig Wisemqn, 
Ms. Barney testified concerning her visit with Ms. Hales 
to appellant's home on November 21, 1978, and the subsequent 
activities at the Golden Spike Restaurant (Tr.43-49). Mr. 
Wiseman testified regarding his request of Ms. Hales on 
November 20, 1978, to procure marijuana for him and the 
manner in which the drug was later delivered and payment 
made. (Tr.52-58). Respondent contends that even if Ms. 
Hales' role in this crime can be constru.ed as that of an 
accomplice, these two witnesses sufficiently support her 
testimony to satisfy the statutory and case law requirements 
of corroboration. 
The landmark corroboration case in Utah is 
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941). Here 
the Utah Court interpreted § 105-32-18, (Rev. St. 1933) --
an identical corroboration statute to the one above quoted 
and held: 
. . . corroboration need not go 
to all the material facts testified 
to by the accomplice. [Citation 
omitted); that the corroborative evidence 
need not be sufficient in itself to 
support a conviction; it may be 
slight and entitled to little consid-
eration. [Citations omitted). 
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On the other hand, the corroborat-
ing evidence must implicate the defend-
ant in the offense and be consistent 
with his guilt and inconsistent with 
his innocence, and must do more than 
cast a grave suspicion on him, and 
all of this must be without the aid 
of the testimony of the accomplice. 
[Citations omitted]. 
120 P.2d at 299. 
The Court further defined the standards for corroborative 
testimony by holding that: 
In order to sustain a conviction, 
the evidence . . . must be of such 
persuasive force that the mind might 
be reasonably satisfied of all the 
necessary facts constituting the 
defendant's guilt beyond any reason-
able doubt; and where the proof of a 
necessary fact is dependent solely 
upon circumstantial evidence, such 
circumstances must be such as to 
reasonably exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis other than the existence 
of such fact and be consistent with 
its non-existence. It is not nec-
essary that each circumstance in 
itself establish the guilt of the 
defendant, but the whole chain of 
circumstances, taken together, must 
produce the required proof. 
120 P.2d at 302. 
In accord, State v. Bruner, 106 Ctah 49, 145 P.2d 302 (1944), 
State v. Vigil, 123 Utah 495, 260 P.2d 539 (1953), and State 
\'.Baron, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970). 
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Applying these standards to the present case, 
the testimony of Ms. Barney and Mr. Wiseman satisfy the 
outlin.ed requirements. Even if their testimony can be 
considered as not "[going] to all the material facts 
testified to by" Ms. Hales, would not "be sufficient in 
itself to support a conviction" and both are "slight and 
entitled to little consideration," the testimonies are, 
nonetheless, adequate as corroborative evidence. Erwin 
holds that such evidence, while perhaps insufficient by 
itself to convict, meets the test of sufficiency for 
corroborative evidence purposes. That is, the testimony 
is sufficient if it "irnplicate[s] the defendant," is 
"consistent with his guilt" and "do[es] more than cast 
a grave suspicion on him." Respondent contends that these 
requirements have been met here. Ms. Barney's testimony 
placing Ms. Hales in appellant's horne on the day in 
question, supported Ms. Hales testimony regarding the 
distribution of the marijuana to Mr. Wiseman and thereby 
implicated appellant in the instant offense. Mr. Wiseman 
verified Ms. Hales' testimony as to his initiating the 
procurement of the marijuana and substantiated the evidence 
as to the method of distributing the drug as Ms. Hales 
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testified. This linking corroboration satisfies the statute 
and the case law. 
These requirements outlined in Erwin were stated 
--- . 
in a similar manner in State v. Clark, 3 Utah 2d 382, 284 
P.2d700 (1955): 
* * * It has been uniformly held 
that the test of the sufficiency of 
·the corroborating evidence is that it 
need not be sufficient in itself to 
sustain a conviction, but it must in 
and of itself tend to implicate and 
connect the accused with the commis-
sion of the crime charged, and not 
be consistent with his innocence. 
284 P.2d at 701, quoting State v. Cragun, 85 Utah 149, 
158, 38 P.2d 1071, 1075 (1934). Clark, therfore, holds 
that the generally accepted rule of corroboration is that 
it need not be independently adequate to convict a defend-
ant, but it must tend to implicate him with the crime and 
not be consistent with his innocence. Such requirements 
are satisfied here. 
In State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 
465 (1964), this court was faced with evaluating the 
sufficiency of certain corroborative evidence in a murder 
case. After discussing the facts of the case and analyzing 
the testimony given, the Court stated: 
-21-
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It may well be that certain of 
the foregoing facets of the evidence, 
considered separately, could be re-
garded as not inculpatory and thus be 
vulnerable to defendant's charge that 
it does not connect her with the crime. 
But that is neither the sensible nor 
the practical approach to the problem. 
Nor does the law require that the sep-
arate bits of evidence be viewed in 
isolation. A great many crimes are 
planned to be committed by stealth and 
in secret, as this one was. It is 
necessary and proper to take whatever 
fragments of proof can be found and 
piece them together in conjunction with 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in order to fill in the whole 
mosaic of the crime. We are cognizant 
that our statute uses the language 
"without the aid of the testimony of 
the accomplice" and that it has been 
said that the corroborative evidence 
should be looked at separate and apart 
from his testimony. That is true to 
determine whether there is some inde-
pendent evidence which tends to connect 
the defendant with the crime. But it is 
also true that the evidence can only 
have relevancy to the crime as it relates 
to the circumstances surrounding it. 
389 P.2d at 469 (emphasis in original). 
This broadened construction of sufficient 
corroborative evidence was then illustrated with a hypo-
thetical: 
Conceding the wisdom and pro-
priety of being wary of the testi-
mony of an accomplice, and of not 
permitting a conviction to rest solely 
upon it, nevertheless, reason dictates 
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that the practical exigencies of a 
situation may well require that all 
of the circumstances be viewed to-
gether in order to determine the 
facts. For example: witnesses see 
X coming from the woods. He has a 
knife and is smeared with blood. 
Considered alone, this could well 
be innocent. He may have killed a 
deer. But the body of a man, recently 
killed by stabbing, is found nearby. 
An accomplice to the murder states 
·that he and X did it. It is obvious 
that the observations that were made 
of X near the time and place of the 
murder, considered in the light of 
the later-discovered facts, take on 
a different significance and could 
reasonably be regarded as tending 
to connect X with the crime. The 
same reasoning applies to the instant 
case. The corroborative evidence 
should be considered in relation to 
the other facts shown. When this is 
done it seems undoubted that it could 
be accepted by reasonable minds as 
evidence of substance and probative 
value tending to connect the defendant 
with this crime. This satisfies the 
requirement of the law. 
389 P.2d at 469. In accord, State v. Kitchen, 564 P.2d 760, 
762 (Utah 1977). 
The same logic is applicable in the case at bar. 
i~hile Hs. Barney's and Hr. lhseman' s testimonies viewed 
in isolation could be considered deficient for conviction, 
when ''the whole mosaic of the crime" is analysed, the testi-
monies effectively and adequately corroborate Hs. Hales' 
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testimony. Furthermore, when the evidence is "considered 
in relation to the other facts shown," reasonable minds 
can de'termine that the testimonies of Ms. Barney and Mr. 
Wiseman probatively connect appellant to the crime. While 
Ms. Barney may have only seen the circumstantial events on 
November 21, 1978 and Mr. Wiseman the end product of his 
request of Ms. Hales, taken together the two witnesses' 
testimonies meet the requirements for corroboration. 
State v. Christean, 533 P.2d 872 (Utah 1975), 
re-states this Sinclair rule: 
... it may well be that cer-
tain facets of the evidence, consid-
ered separately, could be regarded 
as not inculpatory and thus be 
vulnerable to the accused's claim 
that it does not connect him with 
the crime. However, the law does 
not require that the separate bits 
of evidence be viewed in isolation, 
for it is proper to take whatever 
fragments of proof that can be 
found and piece them together with 
the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in order to fill 
in the whole mosaic of the crime. 
Although a conviction may not rest 
solely upon the testimony of an 
accomplice, all of the circumstances 
may be viewed together to determine 
the facts. The corroborative evi-
dence should be considered in relation 
to the other facts appearing in the 
evidence of record. If, in utilizing 
this process, it can be accepted by 
reasonable minds, as evidence of 
substance and probative value tending 
to connect the defendant with the 
crime, the requirements of the law 
are fulfilled. 
533 P.2d at 876. 
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Respondent submits that in viewing the corrob-
orative evidence in relation to the other facts appearing 
in the record, reasonable minds can properly accept the 
evidence as substantive and probative in value, tending 
to connect appellant to the crime. Thus, the requirements 
of the accomplice corroboration law are fulfilled. 
Furthermore, respondent claims that the tests outlined 
in State v. Erwin, supra, are satisfied in this case and 
that therefore, if, arguendo, Ms. Hales was appellant's 
accomplice, sufficient corroborative evidence was presented 
to support Ms. Hales' testimony and, in addition, Judge 
Ballif's determination of appellant's guilt. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, 
THAT JILL HALES WAS AP-
PELLk~T'S ACCOMPLICE AND 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID 
APPLY THE NEW ACCOMPLICE 
STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-31-18, SUCH APPLI-
CATION WAS PROPER. 
As noted above, respondent contends that Jill 
Hales was not an accomplice in this matter and that 
consequently, there is no need to discuss any accomplice 
statute. Yet, since this Court has permitted an Amicus 
Curiae brief to be filed, respondent will answer the legal 
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issues raised therein. The Amicus brief deals entirely 
with the constitutional issue of application of ex post 
facto 'laws; the primary brief's major emphasis also focuses 
on this issue. 
This issue centers on the disparate requirements 
of the two Utah accomplice statutes which were both in 
effect at various times throughout the crime's commission 
and the trial. The earlier statute, § 77-31-18, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) as amended, provided: 
Conviction on testimony of accomplice. 
- A conviction shall not be had on the 
testimony of an accomplice, unless he 
is corroborated by other evidence, 
which in itself and without the aid of 
the testimony of the accomplice tends 
to connect the defendant with the corn-
mission of the offense; and the corrob-
oration shall not be sufficient, if it 
merely shows the commission of the 
offense or the circumstances thereof. 
The statute, § 77-31-18, as enacted by the Utah 
Legislature, effective May 8, 1979, now provides: 
Conviction on uncorroborated testimony 
of accomplice-cautionary instruction.-(1) 
A conviction may be had on the uncorrob-
orated testimony of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an 
instruction to the jury may be given to 
the effect that such uncorroborated 
testimony should be viewed with caution, 
and such an instruction should be given 
if the trial judge finds the testimony 
of the accomplice to be self contradictory, 
uncertain, or improbable. 
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It is undisputed that the offense at issue here 
was committed while the earlier statute was in effect and, 
therefore, it is the controlling law, in most circumstances. 
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 386 1 L. Ed. 648, (1798). 
Respondent submits, however, that an exception to the 
general rule is applicable here inasmuch as changes in 
statutory requirements that are procedural may be applied 
retroactively. (See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S. 
Ct. 68, 70 L. Ed. 216 (1925) and discussion, infra.) 
This new statute procedurally alters the former law of 
accomplice corroboration and thus can be so applied. 
The landmark case in the area of ex post facto 
laws and their general prohibition is Calder v. Bull, supra. 
There the United States Supreme Court outlined four catagories 
of laws which must be regarded as ex post facto and, hence, 
void in application: 
I will state what laws I consider 
ex post facto laws, within the ·,;ords 
and intent of the prohibition. 1st. 
Every la\v that makes an action done 
before the passing of the law, and 
which was innocent when done, criminal; 
and punishes such action. 2d. Every 
law that aggravates a crime, or makes 
it greater than it was, when committed. 
3d. Everv law that chances the punish-
ment and-inflicts a gre~ter punishment, 
than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed. 
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4th. Every law that alters the legal 
rules of evidence, and receives less, 
or different testimony, than the law 
required at the time of the commission 
of the offence [sic), in order to con-
vict the offender. 
3 Dall. (U.S.) at 390. (Emphasis in original.) The first 
three categories are not applicable here; the fourth one 
is. The Calder Court itself recognized, however, that 
"[e) very ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; 
but every restropective law is not an ex post facto law: 
the former only are prohibited." Id., at 390. (Emphasis 
in original.) Therfore, in this most important landmark 
case, exceptions to the general rule are alluded to. 
The fourth category of Calder's list has been 
eroded and interpreted more than the other three, especially 
as to Calder's statement that only ex post facto retrospective 
laws are prohibited. In 16 Am. Jur. 2d 735, Constitutional I 
Law § 396, the following observation is made: 
Doubts have been entertained, however, 
by some of the courts and authorities 
as to whether the fourth class does 
not include cases outside the prohibi-
tion and whether every law that alters 
the legal rules of evidence and receives 
different testimony from that which the 
law required at the time of the com-
mission of the offense, in order to 
convict the offender, is an ex post 
facto lav;. 
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See Moore v. State, 43 NJL 203 (1881); Beazell v. Ohio, 
supra; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 u.s. 589, 21 s.ct. 
730, 45 L. Ed. 1015 (1901); King v. Missouri, 107 u.s. 
221, 2 S.Ct.443, 27 L. Ed. 506 (1882); and Hopt v. Utah, 
llO U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262 (1894). 
In Beazell v. Ohio, supra, this exception and 
modification of Calder's fourth category is clearly out-
lined. The statute in question in Beazell affected "only 
the manner in which the trial of those jointly accused 
shall be conducted." Id., at 170. The United States 
Supreme Court ruled: 
Expressions are to be found in 
earlier judicial opinions to the effect 
that the constitutional limitation may 
be transgressed by alterations in the 
rules of evidence or procedure [cita-
tions omitted]. And there may be 
procedural changes which operate to 
deny to the accused a defense available 
under the laws in force at the time 
of the commission of his offense, or 
which otherwise affect him in such a 
harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall 
within the constitutional prohibition 
[citations omitted]. But it is now 
well settled that statutory changes 
in the mode of trial or the rules of 
evidence, which do not deprive the 
accused of a defense and which operate 
only in a limited and unsubstantial 
manner to his disadvantage, are not 
prohibited. A statute which, after 
indictment, enlar0es the class of 
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persons who may be witnesses at the 
trial, by removing the disqualification 
of persons convicted of felony, is not 
an ex post facto law. [Citation omitted] 
nor is a statute which changes the 
rules of evidence after the indictment 
so as to render admissible against the 
accused evidence previously held inad-
missible, [citation omitted] or which 
changes the place of trial, [citation 
omitted] or which abolishes a court 
for hearing criminal appeals, creating 
a new one in its stead. [citation omitted]. 
269 u.s. at 170-171. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, where the statutory changes only have a 
limited and unsubstantial effect to the accused, there 
such statute, while ex post facto in application, is not 
prohibited as a retrospective law. Furthermore, the Beazell 
Court stressed that the prohibition of retrospective laws 
generally applied to statutes: 
. . . which purport to make innocent 
acts criminal after the event, or to 
aggravate an offense, are harsh and 
oppressive, and that the criminal 
quality attributable to an act, either 
by the legal definition of the offense 
or by the riature or amount of the 
punishment imposed for its commission, 
should not be altered by legislative 
enactment, after the fact, to the 
disadvantage of the accused. 
269 U.S. at 170. Such harsh consequences are not present 
in the instant matter. The act the appellant committed 
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herein was just as criminal before the new accomplice 
statute was passed as after. Respondent submits that 
the long history of the repugnancy of ex post facto 
retrospective laws lies in the general prohibition of 
laws which make criminal an act which was innocent when 
committed and the imposition of a greater penalty on an 
offense than was present when committed. In other words, 
the first three Calder categories must be interpreted 
strictly to protect the innocent or less culpable; yet, 
the fourth category must be construed more liberally so 
as to allow the courts flexibility in applying newly 
enacted procedural legislation where the accused's 
fundamental rights are not threatened by such new laws. 
Appellant and amicus argue that the change in 
the law at issue here was a substantive change because 
under the new law the "quantum and kind of proof necessary 
to establish guilt" has been altered to appellant's 
disadvantage. (See Beazell v. Ohio, supra, and Amicus 
brief , at p.9.) However, a close reading of Beazell, 
and Hopt v. Utah, supra, --which appellant and amicus 
rely upon--does not hold so narrowly. 
Beazell, as above quoted, clearly holds that the 
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prohibition of retrospective statutes does not apply to 
laws "which do not deprive the accused of a defense and 
which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner." 
Id., at 170. Only those after-the-fact statutes which 
I 
work a serious disadvantage against an accused are proscribed, 
Hopt, supra, also supports this view. There 
the United States Supreme Court distinguished ex post laws 
which "deprive the accused of a substantial right" with 
a second category of laws that: 
do not attach criminality 
to any act previously done and which 
was innocent when done; nor aggravate 
any crime theretofore committed; nor 
provide a greater punishment therefor 
than was prescribed at the time of 
its commission; nor do they alter the 
degree, or lessen the amount or measure, 
of the proof which was made necessary 
to conviction when the crime was 
committed. . . 
Any statutory alteration of the 
legal rules of evidence which would 
authorize conviction upon less proof, 
in amount or degree, than was required 
when the offence [sic] was committed, 
might, in respect of that offence [sic] 
be obnoxious to the constitutional 
inhibition upon ex post facto laws. 
110 U.S. at 589-590. (Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, this second category of laws may be 
applied retroactively. Respondent admits that while Hopt 
holds certain legislative changes in the rules of evidence 
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"might ... be obnoxious to the constitutional inhibition" 
prohibiting retrospective ex post facto laws, Hopt recog-
nizes that the reverse is also true. That is, the ex post 
facto prohibition has no application to changes which 
relate to various modes of procedure. 
Numerous cases support the view that procedural 
changes are not proscribed by the ex post facto rule: 
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed. 
1061 (1898), rules of criminal procedure; Thompson v. 
Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898), 
changes in admissibility of circumstantial evidence permitted; 
Ashe v. United States, 270 U.S. 424, 46 S.Ct. 333, 70 L. 
Ed. 662 (1926), granting or witholding of peremptory 
challenges; Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 233, 29 N.W. 911 (1886), 
allowing jury rather than court to fix punishment and 
determining that court rather than jury will be judge of 
the law; People v. campbell, 59 Cal. 243, (1881), change 
from indictment to information; State v. Kavanaugh, 32 N.M. 
~04, 258 P. 209 (1927), change in the number of grand jurors; 
t.=ope Mutual Insurance Co. v. Flynn, 38 Mo. 483, (1866) 
and State v. Barrett, 138 N.C. 630, 50 S.E. 506 (1905), 
al~er the force to be given to designated facts in determining 
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whether certain presumptions should arise; Beazell v. Ohio, 
supra, changes in mode of presenting questions and proof 
of the· relative credibility of evidence; State v. Morton, 
338 s.w. 2d 858, (Mo., 1960), judge may hear evidence of 
prior convictions out of jury's presence; People v. Edenbu~, 
88 Cal. App. 558, 263 P. 857 (1928), court may make 
initial examination of veniremen; People v. Gibson, 39 
Cal. App. 202, 178 P.338 (1919), qualifications for jury 
service; Beazell v. Ohio, supra, joint trial of offenders; 
People v. Qualey, 210 N.Y. 202, 104 N.E. 138 (1914), 
entering deposition of deceased witness was no violation 
of right to "face-to-face" confrontation of accusers or 
witnesses; State v. Clevenger, 69 Wash. 2d 136, 417 P.2d 
626 (1966), abandonment of prohibition on inter-spousal 
testimony allowed even though prospective; State v. Pope, 
73 Wash. 2d 919, 442 P.2d 994 (1968), changes in restriction: 
on competency of certain classes of witnesses; and Splawn 
v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 97 S.Ct. 1987, 52 L. Ed. 2d 
606 (1977), alteration in jury instruction statute was 
constitutionally sound even though passed after defendant's 
criminal offense. 
A most recent United States Supreme Court case 
further clarifies under what circumstances ex post facto 
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statutes may be retroactively applied. In Dobbert v. 
Florida, 432 u.s. 282, 97 s.ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 344 (1977), 
a first degree murder conviction was challenged and the Court 
was faced with deciding if the changes in Florida's death 
penalty statute between the time of the murder and the 
time of trial were "procedural and on the whole ameliorative, 
and hence . . [not an] ex post facto violation." Id., 
at 283. The court held that it is a well-settled priniciple 
of law: 
... that "[t]he inhibition upon 
the passage of ex post facto laws 
does not give a-criiDinar-a:right 
to be tried, in all respects, by 
the law in force when the crime 
charged was committed." [citation 
omitted]. "[T]he constitutional 
provision was intended to secure 
substantial personal rights against 
arbitrary and oppressive legislation, 
[citation omitted], and not to · 
limit the legislative control of 
remedies and modes of procedure 
which do not affect matters of 
substance." [citation omitted]. 
Even though it may work to 
the disadv~ntage of a defendant, 
a procedural change is not ex 
post facto. 
* * * In the case at hand, the change 
in the statute was clearly procedural. 
The new statute simply altered the 
methods employed in determining 
whether the death penalty was to be 
imposed; there was no change in the 
quantum of punishment attached to 
the crime. The following language 
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from [Hopt v. Utah, supra,] applicable 
with equal force to the case at hand, 
summarizes our conclusion that the 
change was procedural and not a violation 
of the Ex Post Facto Clause: 
-- "The crime for which the 
present defendant was indicted, 
the punishment prescribed there-
for, and the quantity or the 
degree of proof necessary to 
establish his guilt, all re-
mained unaffected by the sub-
sequent statute." 110 U.S., 
at 589-590, 4 s.ct., at 210. 
In this case, not only was the 
change in the law procedural, it was 
ameliorative. It is axiomatic that 
for a law to be ex post facto it 
must be more onerous than the prior 
law. Petitioner argues that the change 
in the law harmed him because the 
jury's recommendation of life im-
prisonment would not have been subject 
to review by the trial judge under 
the prior law. But it certainly 
cannot be said with assurance that, 
had his trial been conducted under 
the old statute, the jury would have 
returned a verdict of life. 
432 U.S. at 293-294 (Emphasis added.) It should be empha-
sized here that the Supreme Court in Dobbert rejected the 
"work-to-the-disadvantage-of-a-defendant" test as the 
measure in determining whether an ex post facto law will 
be prohibited or allowed. Rather, the Dobbert test seems 
to be that a reviewing court must only determine whether 
the new law alters substantive or procedural rights of 
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the accused. If found to be the former, then the law may 
not be retroactively applied; if found to be the latter, 
then it may. Also, the Dobbert test examines whether the 
new law is more onerous than the former and prohibits or 
allows the law's application accordingly. 
It is also crucial that Dobbert re-asserts the 
ex post facto rule of Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 
16 s.ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) that an accused has no 
vested right "to be tried, in all respects, by the law in 
force w.hen the crime charged was committed." Id., at 590. 
In accord, Thompson v. Missouri, supra; Van Voorhis v. D.C., 
236 F. Supp. 978 (D.D.C. 1965); Adelman ·v. Adelman, 58 Misc. 
2d 803, 296 N.Y.S. 2d 999 (1969); Merchants Despatch Transp. 
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Cornrn., 20 Ariz. App. 276, 512 P.2d 
39 (1973); Oklahoma Water Res. Bd. v. Central Oklahoma 
Master Con. Dist., 464 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1969); Allen v. Fisher, 
118 Ariz. 95, 574 P.2d 1314 (1977); In ReMarriage of Bouquet, 
128 Cal. Rptr. 427,546 P.2d 1371 (1976); and State v. 
Malone, 9 Wash. App. 122, 511 P.2d 67 (1973). 
Respondent contends that the principles outlined 
i". Dobbert are dispositive of the present case: (1) appellant 
cannot expect all la\vS and procedural rights in force at 
~~e time of the offense to be unchanged and effective at 
t~e trial; (2) while an additional hardship may fall on 
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appellant because of the change, such burden does not per 
se make the law void as per the ex post facto clause; and 
(3) the crime, the punishment and the elements needed tc 
be proven have all remained unchanged throughout the 
course of this matter. (In regards to this last point, 
see State v. Coleman, 540 P.2d 953 (Utah 1975); Paul v. 
State, 483 P.2d 1176 (Okla., 1971): Johnson v. Morris, 
87 Wash. 2d 922, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976); and State v. Jones, 
214 Kan. 568, 521 P.2d 278 (1974)). All of these principles 
are applicable herein and respondent urges the court to 
rule that the new § 77-31-18 Utah Code Ann. (1979) is 
a procedural alteration of the accomplice statute and may 
be validly applied retroactively. 
Finally, respondent recognizes that a similar 
case has been decided by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Amicus cites the case of Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Civil, 591 F.2d 255 (CA 3, 1979) in which the repeal of 
the Virgin Islands' corroboration of accomplice statute 
was held to substantially affect the defendant and therefou 
the trial court could not retroactively apply the statute's 
repeal. 
This however is not the case here. The Utah 
accomplice statute, § 77-31-18 Utah Code Ann. (1953) as 
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amended, was replaced with the new statute. (See ~ 
for the quoted laws.) Recognizing the need to qualify the 
new statute, the Legislature included a second subsection -
(§ 77-31-18(2) (1979)), which makes adequate provision for the 
trial judge to caution jury members of the possible 
improbable, uncertain or contradictory nature of an 
accomplice's testimony. The Virgin Islands statute, on 
the other hand, was repealed and no new statute nor qualifying 
modification was put in its place. Thus, the ex post facto 
principles above discussed regarding changes in statutes or 
altering procedural modes of trial, etc. are inapplicable to 
the Civil case. Clearly, where a change in the law is as 
drastic as Civil, the ex post facto prohibition is justified. 
No such drastic action is present in the instant case. 
In conclusion, respondent urges that each ex 
post facto law must be carefully scrutinized on a case-by-
case basis in order to determine whether the law should be 
proscribed or allowed. In the words of Justice Stone in 
Beazell v. Ohio, supra: 
Just ~hat alterations of procedure 
~ill be held to be of sufficient moment 
to transgress the constitutional prohib-
ition cannot be embraced within a formula 
or stated in a general proposition. The 
distinction is one of degree. But the 
constitutional provision was intended to 
secure substantial personal rights against 
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arbitrary and oppressive legislation, 
[citation omitted], and not to limit 
the legislative control of remedies 
and modes of procedure which do not 
affect matters of substance. [citations 
omitted.] 
269 U.S. at 170. (Emphasis added.) 
This same view was well-stated in Hochman, 
"The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retro-
active Legislation," 73 Harvard Law Review 692 (1960): 
[W]hen one considers the great vari-
ety of cases, it becomes clear that 
no one factor is sufficient to explain 
the results which the Court has reached. 
Rather it is submitted that the con-
stitutionality of such a statute is 
determined by three major factors, 
each of which must be weighed in any 
particular case. These factors are: 
the nature and strength of the public 
interest served by the statute, the 
extent to which the statute modifies 
or abrogates the asserted preenactment 
right, and the nature of the right 
which the statute alters. Since the 
great variety of cases in this field 
do not lend themselves to sweeping 
generalizations, it seems inappropriate 
to attempt to develop an ideal scheme 
for the Court to follow in cases in-
volving retroactive statutes nor even 
to offer a formula for predicting the 
result in any given class of cases. 
73 Harvard Law Review at 696-697. 
Respondent urges that once this Court specifically considers 
the public interest served by the new statute, the 
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modification of appellant's rights thereunder, and the 
nature of the right affected by the change that the new 
accomplice statute will be deemed to alter only procedural 
modes of trial and that it may therefore be 'retroactively 
applied. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court had sufficient evidence and 
legal support to rule that Jill Hales was not appellant's 
accomplice. Thus, her testimony alone could convict 
appellant. 
Assuming that Jill Hales was appellant's accomplice, 
there was nonetheless ample corroborati~e evidence offered 
at trial to support Ms. Hales' testimony. 
Finally, even if the trial court applied the 
new accomplice statute (which respondent contends was not 
applied in this case), its application would have been 
proper since an analysis of the legal rules of ex post 
facto priniciples shows that the law at issue only proce-
durally changes preexisting modes of trial. 
On the basis of the above authority and the 
evidence against appellant presented at trial, respondent 
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prays that the verdict and sentence be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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